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ENvIRoNMENTAL LAW: WHAT Is "MAJOR ' IN
"MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION"?
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz,
498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974)
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent further
logging, begun pursuant to contract with the United States Forest Serv-
ice, by the private defendants in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area
(BWCA).' Finding that certain activities of the defendant Forest
Service required the preparation of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Acte
(NEPA), the federal district court enjoined logging operations until the
statement had been prepared.' Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held: The Forest Service's modifi-
cation or extension of some of the contracts and its supervision of de-
fendant's day-to-day logging activities constitute major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the
purview of NEPA.4
The National Environmental Policy Act was the product of ten years
of congressional interest and discussion.' To give substance to the new
1. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area of northern Minnesota is part of the Superior
National Forest. Its 1,060,000 acres of lakes, streams, and trees make the Area a natu-
ral resource of great beauty. Along with the adjoining Canadian Quetico-Superior For-
est, it forms the world's only canoe wilderness area. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1316 (8th Cir. 1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
3. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 630 (D.
Minn. 1973). The defendants included the Secretary of Agriculture, the U.S. Forest
Service, various wood and paper product manufacturing corporations, and a group of in-
dependent loggers. Id. at 597-604. The Forest Service administered the BWCA Man-
agement Plan under which private groups were sold rights to remove timber from the
BWCA. Id. at 604-09. Logging operations began prior to January 1, 1970, the effective
date of NEPA. After that date, however, the Forest Service extended and modified
some of the sales contracts and exercised general supervision over the logging operations.
Id.
4. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974)
(en banc).
5. See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN Tm CouRTs (1973) thereinafter cited
as ANDERSON]. The major policy statements of the Act are found in section 101 of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970),
commits to the President the responsibility for overseeing the effectiveness of the legis-
lation and reporting to Congress on his findings. The Council on Environmental Qual-
ity was created to assist the President in this task.
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policy provisions, Congress included "action-forcing" provisions that re-
quired federal agencies to review certain current and proposed actions
and prepare written statements assessing the possible environmental
impact of the actions." While section 101 of NEPA contains the pri-
mary policy statement, most litigation has been generated by the action-
forcing provisions of section 102, particularly the section 102(2)(C)
requirement that agencies prepare an EIS on proposals for "major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
"7
Litigation under section 102(2)(C), s challenging agency decisions
not to prepare an EIS,9 has resulted in the development of two stand-
ards of judicial review of the agency action. The Second Circuit has
adopted the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act1 ° (APA), a standard giving great deference to the
"threshold" agency decision not to prepare an EIS." The Fifth and
6. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAiRs, NATIONAL ENVIRoNMENTAL
PoLIcY AcT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969):
If goals and principles are to be effective, they must be capable of being ap-
plied in action. S. 1075 thus incorporates certain action forcing provisions and
procedures ....
The "action-forcing" provisions are found in subsections 102(2) (A)-(H) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4332(2) (A)-(H) (1970). The most important of these provisions states:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the hu-
man environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra; see also ANDERsoN
57.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
9. This litigation has focused on the construction of the statutory language "major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." See, e.g.,
Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Save Our
Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
The adequacy of statements has also been challenged in litigation focusing on the re-
quirements found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2) (C) (i)-(v) (1970). See, e.g., Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 931 (1973); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972), aff'd,
486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
11. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973):
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Tenth Circuits, relying on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,12 have adopted a "reasonableness" standard, which allows a
more penetrating judicial review of the agency decision.13 The differ-
ence between the two standards as applied is minimal, however. Even
those courts adopting the "arbitrary and capricious" standard have thor-
oughly examined the agency decision.' 4 The trend thus appears to be
in the direction of careful judicial scrutiny of the agency's determina-
tion not to prepare a statement.' 5
We see no reason for application of a different approach here since the APA
standard permits effective judicial scrutiny of agency actions and concommi-
tantly permits the agencies to have some leeway in applying the law to factual
contexts in which they possess expertise.
For other cases applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, see Maryland-Na-
tional Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 349 F. Supp. 1212
(D.D.C. 1972), remanded on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens
for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Citizens for
Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972); Goose Hollow Foothills
League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971); Echo Park Residents Comm. v.
Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
12. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Construing section 4(f) of the Department of Transpor-
tation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970), which mandates that transportation plans must
"include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed,"
the Court in Overton Park developed a "substantial inquiry" standard of review, which
allowed judicial inquiry beyond the question whether the agency's action was arbitrary
and capricious.
13. The Fifth Circuit was the first to adopt a "reasonableness" standard. Save Our
Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973) (action to enjoin construction of
federal office building). The court stated:
[The agency's] decision should have been court-measured under a more re-
laxed rule of reasonableness. . ..
. . . The spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision
that the project was minor or did not significantly affect the environment were
too well shielded from impartial review.
Id. at 465-66; accord, Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.
1973). The Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Save Our Ten Acres decision
in Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). Some
courts have adopted a procedure calling for a de novo consideration of the merits of
the proposal when reviewing agency action. See Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310
(N.D.W. Va. 1972); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp.
356 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd on
other grounds, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
14. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Serv., 349 F. Supp. 1212 (D.D.C. 1972), remanded on other grounds, 487 F.2d
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp.
696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
15. Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act, [Monograph] BNA EN-
ViroN. REP. No. 17, at 24 (Jan. 4, 1974) states:
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Courts have used various methods of analysis in construing the phrase
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."' 6 Courts have found agency action to be within the cov-
erage of NEPA in cases involving highway construction,'1 dams and
watershed projects,' electric power projects,' 9 and building construc-
The better-reasoned cases seem to favor the substantial inquiry test, and,
while the issue is as yet unresolved, it would appear that the courts will assume
an ever-increasing role in scrutinizing agency decisions that a particular action
is not a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.
See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1177 (6th Cir. 1972); Greene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972);
City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
16. The question whether an action is "federal" is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. It should be noted, however, that the courts have readily found federal action.
See Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230, 230 n.2 (1970):
The Act is limited to federal activities-a limitation perhaps not quite as
serious as it may at first appear. Many state, local and private environmental
activities have some not insubstantial nexus to a federal department or agency.
Arguably, such a nexus may suffice for applicability of the Act.
See also ANDERSON 57-73.
MPIRG may be the first case to raise the question whether a major federal action
could significantly affect the environment but not the the "human" environment. The
court dismissed this contention in one paragraph, 498 F.2d at 1322, and it seems doubt-
ful that the issue will receive more serious treatment in other cases.
17. See, e.g., Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975); Conservation Soc'y
of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Tramp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed sub nom. Coleman v. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S.
May 9, 1975) (No. 74-1413); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); Brooks
v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458
F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Named Individual Members
of the San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
18. See, e.g., Trout Unltd. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club
v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afj'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1973); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.
N.C. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878
(D.D.C. 1971).
19. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hodel, 511 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1974); Union of Con-
cerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Jicarilla Apache Tribe of
Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC,
455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); Citizens
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tion.20  Beyond these factual groupings, courts have been inconsistent
in finding agency action to be major and significant.2' Some courts
have chosen a definitional approach, finding agency action to be
"major" if it "requires substantial planning, time, resources or expendi-
tures, 2 or if the agency retains any significant discretionary powers, 3
for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Izaak Wal-
ton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Lynn, 477
F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973);
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Rom-
ney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971). But cf. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn,
476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
United States Postal Serv., 349 F. Supp. 1212 (D.D.C. 1972), remanded on other
grounds, 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3
E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
21. The courts have required an EIS in the following cases: Wyoming Outdoor
Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973) (Forest Service lumber con-
tract); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (FPC refusal
of certificate for proposed pipeline); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Mor.
ton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (lease of 380,000 acres of ocean floor); National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (proposed cancellation of gov-
ernment procurement of helium); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn.
1972) (Corps of Engineers dredging of harbor); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D.
Fla. 1972) (Corps of Engineers spraying herbicide to kill vegetation in river); Boston
Waterfront Resident's Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972) (pro-
posed demolition of historical buildings); City of New York v. United States, 337 F.
Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (ICC approval of abandonment of local railroad operation);
Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971) (Corps of Engineers approval of refuse
dumping in navigable stream); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F.
Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971) (pesticide control of fire ants by Secretary of Agriculture);
Brotherhood Blocks Ass'n v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Dev., 5 E.R.C. 1867 (E.D.
N.Y. 1973) (sale of 152 parcels of repossessed land in Brooklyn).
In other cases the courts found that the agency action was either not "major," or not
"significant," or both. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973) (dredging permit
for marina); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (channel improvement
and creation of small reservoir); Citizens Organized to Defend Environment, Inc. v.
Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (approval of transfer of mining equipment
across interstate highway); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972) (con-
struction of 4.3-mile road in national forest); Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp.
88 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (widening of city street); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F.
Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972) (introduction of "stretch" jets at Washington National Air-
port); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972) (mock
amphibious assault by Marines). See also Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476
F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
United States Postal Serv., 349 F. Supp. 1212 (D.D.C. 1972); Echo Park Resident's
Comm. v. Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
22. Citizens Organized to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520,
540 (S.D. Ohio 1972); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp.
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or, following a narrower view, "only when a project is wholly or partly
federally funded."2 4  The courts have also disagreed whether the
words "major" and "significantly" should be construed separately (the
bifurcated approach)25 or together.20  None of these methods of analy-
sis, however, have produced consistent results. Perhaps the most accu-
rate conclusion is that the existence of "major Federal action" must
be determined in each case by "a judgment based on the circumstances
of a proposed action. ''ar
The majority in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz28
relied on the policy considerations underlying NEPA to support the first
two stages of its opinion. First, the majority found that the concern
for environmental disclosure in NEPA was so great that an agency
should have little discretion in its decision to prepare an EIS.2' Having
356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D.
Iowa 1972).
23. Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 890 (1st Cir. 1973).
24. James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority,
359 F. Supp. 611, 628 (E.D. Va.), afrd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
25. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972):
Defendants claim that the term "major Federal action" refers to the cost of
the project, the amount of planning that preceded it, and the time required to
complete it, but does not refer to the impact of the project on the environment.
We agree with the defendants that the two concepts are different ....
Accord, Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
26. Cf. Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.), rev'g
359 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Wyo. 1973) (adopted Hanly rationale, see cases cited note 25
supra); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). See also
Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Conservation Soc'y
of S. Vt., Inc. v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 508
F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coleman v. Conservation Soc'y
of S. Vt., Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. May 9, 1975) (No. 74-1413); Citizens for Reid
State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
This is not, however, a well developed area, for agencies have generally conceded that
a project was major and argued instead that it created no significant effect on the envi-
ronment. See Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D.
Ore. 1971). As a result, few courts have considered the question.
27. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 n.7 (5th Cir. 1973), quoting
Public Bldg. Serv. procedure 1095.1A, Attachment B, 36 Fed. Reg. 23336 (1971).
28. 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 1320:
Section 102(1) of the Act contains a Congressional direction that environ-
mental factors be considered "to the fullest extent possible." An initial deci-
sion not to prepare an EIS precludes the full consideration directed by Con-
gress. In view of the concern for environmental disclosure present in NEPA,
the agency's discretion as to whether an impact statement is required is prop-
erly exercised only within narrow bounds.
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concluded that a reviewing court was not committed by law to the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard, the court adopted a standard of "reason-
ableness in the circumstances.""0  Second, relying on the Council on
Environmental Quality Guidelines 5 and 11, 31 the court stated that the
bifurcated approach32 "does little to foster the purposes of the Act,"33
and determined that it would consider the "magnitude of the federal
action" together with "its impact on the environment.""4
In the third stage of the opinion, the majority used its "reasonable-
ness under the circumstances" standard to scrutinize the Forest Service
determination that its actions were neither major nor significant. The
court adopted, without question, the district court's findings that logging
significantly affected the BWCA.3 5 The court considered only the in-
volvement of the Service in the logging operations, and, after listing
the supervisory activities of the Service,36 the court concluded that the
agency's activities were as "significant" as those found to be major fed-
eral action in prior cases in which agencies had authorized actions by
private parties.3 7 In particular, the majority noted that the Service's
income from the logging contracts was "clearly inadequate to finance
the [required] reforestation program.' 38
The dissent, pointing out that the Forest Service actions when
viewed alone were very minor, 9 called for a narrow standard of review
30. Id.
31. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971), subsequently codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.6,
1500.13 (1975).
32. See cases cited note 25 supra and accompanying text.
33. 498 F.2d at 1321.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1322.
36. Id.:
The Forest Service has been significantly involved with these timber sales
.... Its contracts require it to, inter alia, approve locations of timber roads,
logging camps and buildings; mark the trees to be cut; and negotiate payment
for the timber cut. In addition, it extended six of the sales after the effective
date of NEPA and made contract modifications with the consent of the pur-
chasers on seven of the sales.
37. Id. at 1323:
These actions were as significant in the context of these timber sales as was
the approval of a right-of-way and coal stack heights found to be major federal
action in Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton [471 F.2d 1275 (9th
Cir. 1973)], and the clear cutting of some 670 acres of timber pursuant to
Forest Service sales found to be major federal action in Wyoming Outdoor
Coordinating Council v. Butz [484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973)].
38. Id. at 1322-23.
39. Id. at 1325.
Vol. 1975:485] 491
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giving great judicial deference to agency expertise.40 Although argu-
ing for reversal, the dissenters were more concerned that the majority
had overstepped the bounds of the judicial role than with the result
in this particular case.41
Neither of the opinions showed a full understanding of the applicable
case law. By citing cases in which agency approval of action by private
parties was found to be major federal action,42 the majority relied on,
but did not adequately explore, the licensing/permit analysis. Agency
approval or licensing of major action by private parties should suffice
to meet the statutory requirement of major federal action.43 When the
federal activity is limited to licensing and supervision, any rational mea-
sure of the magnitude of the federal action must include the private
action that is authorized. The majority, however, failed to look to the
activities of the private contractors to determine whether the logging
operations were "major," and had to exaggerate the supervisory activi-
ties of the Forest Service in order to fit the facts and result in the case
to the statutory language. As a result, the court implicitly held that
the agency action was major because it was significant, thus effectively
reading the word "major" out of the statute.
The majority's analysis also rejected separate review of whether an
agency action is "major" and whether it "significantly affects" the envi-
ronment. The bifurcated approach, nevertheless, seems eminently
sensible.44 Since the private action that has been licensed is usually
40. Id. at 1326.
41. Id., citing Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972)
(Burger, Circuit Justice). In Aberdeen Chief Justice Burger, after noting legislative ad-
vances in environmental protection, stated:
These developments, however praiseworthy, should not lead courts to exercise
equitable powers loosely or casually whenever a claim of "environmental
damage" is asserted. The world must go on and new environmental legislation
must be carefully meshed with more traditional patterns of federal regulation.
The decisional process for judges is one of balancing and it is often a most
difficult task.
42. 498 F.2d at 1323.
43. See Scientist Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. ABC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (footnotes omitted):
iThere is "Federal action" within the meaning of the statute not only when
an agency proposes to build a facility itself, but also whenever an agency
makes a decision which permits action by other parties which will affect the
quality of the environment.
In Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972), the court stated that "the only
involvement necessary by the federal government to constitute major federal action is
approving or licensing the project. . ....
44. As the court in Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D. Iowa
492 [Vol. 1975:485
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of sufficient magnitude, it seems clear that the anomaly suggested by
the majority of a "'minor federal action significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment'-45 would not occur. By rejecting the
bifurcated approach and failing to consider first whether the action is
major, the court twisted the language of the statute.4 If the bifurcated
approach is rejected, one commentator has suggested replacing it with
a "sliding scale" test. 7 Under this suggested test, as the significance
of the environmental impact of the proposed project increases, the
amount of federal involvement necessary to require the filing of an EIS
decreases.48 Despite a disclaimer by the author,49 this proposed test
also risks requiring an EIS without an independent determination that
the action is major. Such a sliding scale would, however, undoubtedly
produce results consistent with the general willingness of the courts to
find that an EIS is required. Nonetheless, the analytical weakness of
the sliding scale test and the strained statutory construction and impre-
cise reasoning of Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz can
be avoided by adoption of the licensing/permit method of analysis.50
Although its analysis might have been clearer, the Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group v. Butz majority decision was consistent with
the judicial view of NEPA as an "environmental full-disclosure law."'"
1972) indicated:
[Tihe inclusion of the term "major" raises the obvious inference that not every
federal action was meant to be included. Congress evidently intended to ex-
clude from consideration the myriad minor activities with which the federal
government becomes involved.
Accord, Citizens Organized to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520,
540 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ("Clearly the NEPA contemplates some federal actions which
are minor, or have so little environmental impact, as to fall outside its scope").
45. 498 F.2d at 1321-22.
46. Viewing the private action as "major" is not such a twisting of the statute, for
the agency decision authorizing the private action is sufficient to "federalize" it.
47. 26 S. CAR. L. REV. 119 (1974).
48. Id. at 134.
49. Id. at 134 n.78.
50. For example, applying the test to the facts of Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,
344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972), a court would find minimal federal involvement (the
Secretary of Transportation's approval of the introduction of stretch jets), and a minimal
effect on the environment (except for being slightly longer, the 727-200 is virtually iden-
tical to the 727-100), and thus no EIS would be required. There were, however, sub-
stantial front-end costs involved in the introduction of these new jets, and it would have
been much more precise for the court to have recognized that while there was a "major"
action being licensed by the federal government, it did not "significantly" affect the en-
vironment.
51. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
493
Washington University Open Scholarship
494 WASINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW'QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:485
Chief Justice Burger has warned the judiciary against stepping into this
role of policy-maker,52 but the extensive line of NEPA cases granting
injunctions pending preparation of an EIS will not be overturned with-
out action by Congress or the Supreme Court.53
52. See Aberdeen-& Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972)
(Burger, Circuit Justice), quoted in Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz,
498 F.2d 1314, 1326 (8th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion); note 41 supra.
53. This conclusion is particularly true if one accepts the view of one commentator
who thinks that all of the procedural questions of 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) have been
settled by the courts and that we are entering a "second generation" of NEPA cases
which will recognize that § 4331 creates substantive rights. See Yarrington, Judicial Re-
view of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D.L. REv. 279 (1974).
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